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Abstract—The recent surge in hardware security is significant
due to offshoring the proprietary Intellectual property (IP). One
distinct dimension of the disruptive threat is malicious logic
insertion, also known as Hardware Trojan (HT). HT subverts
the normal operations of a device stealthily. The diversity in
HTs activation mechanisms and their location in design brings
no catch-all detection techniques. In this paper, we propose to
leverage principle features of social network analysis to security
analysis of Register Transfer Level (RTL) designs against HT.
The approach is based on investigating design properties, and
it extends the current detection techniques. In particular, we
perform both node- and graph-level analysis to determine the
direct and indirect interactions between nets in a design. This
technique helps not only in finding vulnerable nets that can act
as HT triggering signals but also their interactions to influence
a particular net to act as HT payload signal. We experiment the
technique on 420 combinational HT instances, and on average,
we can detect both triggering and payload signals with accuracy
up to 97.37%.
I. INTRODUCTION
The sheer complexity of modern electronic systems and
their distributed supply chain spread across the globe are
growing concerns for establishing trust in Integrated Cir-
cuits (IC) and systems. The untrusted third-parties involved
in fabrication, assembly, packaging, testing, and validation
can make malicious modifications to the ICs to undermine
the security of the system. Such intentional changes, known
as Hardware Trojan (HT), are typically performed without
designer knowledge, and it works as a backdoor to achieve
undesired behavior. The potential threats of HT are often
aligned with the attackers’ objectives that include but not
limited to the leaking secret information (e.g., key), incorrect
functionality, early failure of the device, etc. Vulnerabilities of
the design are often stipulated during pre- and/or post-silicon
where a small HT circuit (3-5x smaller than regular design)
observes certain events and becomes active at an infrequent
time when the device is in the field. The part of the design
showing limited controllability and observability can provide
the required stealthy behavior of HT. Furthermore, the spec-
trum of HTs depending on their physical, activation, and action
characteristics [1] make the current detection approaches non-
trivial [2].
The construction of concurrent HTs is concerned with the
nets that switch rarely within a design. Rare triggering nets
directly influence the location and insertion phase (gate-level
or layout-level). As more and more Commercial Off The Shelf
(COTS) components are integrated within the system without
security verification but to meet time-to-market demands,
the attack surface becomes more dynamic. Hence, traditional
detection approaches need to be transformed to account for
newly published HTs.
During pre-silicon, a defender analyzes the security by
performing logic testing of the design against HT vulnerability.
Although logic testing is independent of the process variations,
it is limited by the simulation cost, which depends on design
size and the modeling of the simulator. Such a simulation-
based technique involves generating random test vector [3]
or high-level statistical modeling [4]–[6] of the design to
propagate the test vector through the design. Regardless of
the vector generation technique, the analysis of the switching
activity of all nodes in a design can identify the nets with the
lowest activity. Based on the study, a designer can generate
region-specific test vector to improve the controllability and
observability of these nets [7], [8].
On the contrary, Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) is performed
to detect minute variations in design parameters (area, power,
and delay) due to the presence of HT [9] during post-silicon.
SCA treats the design as a whole and collects the signature
and compare it with HT-free golden design. The strength
of SCA is challenging due to the decreasing resolution of
HT size and increasing process variations in sub-nm design
[10], [11]. Many of works for HT detection and prevention
require pre-characterization of HT-free design which may
not be available sometime. For example, IP vendors provide
limited information about the internal construction of IP
in their published datasets. Furthermore, the limitations of
logic/functional testing in generating the same test vectors
for both attacker and defender are nearly infeasible due to
ample logical space, and the mechanism of reliability failures
may even mask HT presence. Hence, a common assumption
regarding golden design makes HT detection more challenging
and intractable as to learn the perturbed nets by an attacker
and identify them through SCA.
In this paper, we utilize the concept of the social network
to delineate the relation between design properties and locate
HT within a design. As a first step, we perform a formal
treatment of circuit edge (nets) as it is the heart of HT
triggering. We use essential attributes of edges since adding
or removing edges affect the neighborhood of other edges
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as well as design parameters. Then, identified characteristics
of edges are ranked to understand the potential perturbations
over edges. It also helps to gain insight into an evolving
network (triggering signals) and how it influences other edges
(payload). As there can exist multiple of such network, we
analyze each of this network cluster who can perform collusion
by adding or removing edges strategically. Then, based on
both individual edge and group network, compact test vector
can be generated for inter-cluster. These test patterns would
be completely localized without resorting to logic simulation
a priori and magnify the probable HT location (if any). The
novelty and contributions of the proposed approach are:
• there is no assumption in underlying design (HT-free or
HT-affected), hence the technique is uniform.
• a comprehensive framework for combinational HT de-
tection based on individual (node) and cluster (network)
analysis to identify rare triggering nets.
• a localized test pattern generation technique for neigh-
borhood isomorphism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides an overview of related works on HT localization
based on local vs. global excitation. Section III describes
attack model, related definitions and bottom-up method to
detect HT. Section IV presents the detection capability of the
proposed technique without any knowledge of golden design.
Section V draws the conclusion followed by future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we present the existing HT localization
techniques during both pre- and post-silicon. As our focus in
this paper is the detection of combinational HT, we review
the works that apply heuristics to particular nodes to act
them as HT triggering signal and payload. Many of these
works rely on extracting (rare) transition activity before they
use a specific HT detection methodology. Hence, we broadly
classify simulation technique under two conditions: (a) if
individual edge 1 attributes are considered, and (b) if combined
properties of only a subset of edges are considered without
checking the individual net.
Zhou et al. [12] proposed transition probability enhance-
ment of the nets far from primary inputs by using two input
MUX. The approach is practical for gate-level netlist, but for
low-level (e.g., RT-level), the technique is not scalable. Zhou et
al. [13] approached the combinational HT by fault simulation
(stuck-at). The authors have considered only one type fault
during excitation of a net, however, an attacker can enumerate
multiple nets with different fault model.
For the sub-network based approach, Banga and Hsiao [8]
presented a region of interest around a gate that contains
flip-flops. The technique was successful in detecting sequen-
tial HT, however, the proposed approach is applicable for
combinational HT. Koushanfar and Mirhoseini [14] applied
gate profiling technique to detect side-channel parameters. As
the HT detection problem is NP-hard, the impact of process
1Unless stated elsewhere in the paper, edge and net are used interchange-
ably.
variations can be significant on the individual gate, hence can
mask the HT presence. Wei and Potkonjak [15] presented gate-
level characterization approach where the authors partitioned
the design based on input vector control and profile region-
based current. The technique, however, fails to detect HT if
they are located in multiple regions. Banga and Hsiao [16]
presented miter circuit to detect equivalence between golden
and HT-infected design. The circuit would produce UNSAT if
there is any HT.
Unlike previous techniques, our technique (a) does not
consider any HT excitation by expensive simulation, instead,
applies network parameters, and (b) is scalable for both com-
binational and sequential HT as it classifies most influential
nodes for HT triggering without any heuristics.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Threat Model
We assume the potential inclusion of out-of-spec compo-
nents into the legacy design can happen during pre- and post-
silicon. In pre-silicon, third-party IP vendors can modify parts
of the design and sell to the particular IP buyer where the buyer
may be fabless design house. Similarly, a system integrator
can act as an insider attacker where he has access to design
internals and can subvert any IP cores included in System-
on-Chip (SoC). Even the IP core is encrypted, as a valid
and regular user, the integrator would have the correct key to
unlock the core. During post-silicon, an attacker in the foundry
would have access to GDSII file which he can reverse engineer
to insert HT by changing process parameters (e.g., lithographic
mask).
B. Problem Statement
A combinational circuit can be modeled as Directed Acyclic
Graph (DAG), G (V, E) where V(G) denotes the set of nodes
and E(G) is the directed edge set. The problem involves
identifying the set of edges’ properties, which are potential
candidates for HT triggering and payload. To do so, we convert
G to the edge-labeled graph, G’(E, V) where, E(G’) denotes
nodes (conversely, edges in G) and V(G’) indicates the edge
set (conversely, nodes in G). In our case, to ensure localization
of possible HT, we require to identify at least k candidate
edges in G with high-confidence using the properties defined
in Section III-C.
C. Definitions and Terminology
Centrality, C: returns the number of adjacent nodes to a
particular actor and includes both in- and out-degree of a node.
Hence, nodes having more impact on HT should have lower
centrality and follow an inverse power-law distribution. If Aij
is the adjacency matrix in G’, we can compute C of a node
as follows:
Ci =
∑
j Aij
|Aij | (1)
where |Aij | denotes the total locations where edge exists (i.e.
Aij=1).
Closeness Centrality, CC: determines the shortest path
length from a node to all other nodes. The nodes in G’ showing
the lowest CC (maximum average path length) should be
identified as they can manifest themselves as low controllable
and observable nodes [17]. If the number of edges traversed
between two nodes i and j in the shortest path is sij , CC can
be computed as follows:
CCi =
∑
j sij
|sij | (2)
where |sij | denotes the total number of mutually exclusive
shortest paths.
Betweeness Centrality, BC: acts as a bridge for shortest
paths between two nodes. In general, if the BC value of a
node in G’ is higher, the higher is the chance the node would
act HT payload as the node is reachable from other two nodes
showing lowest CC. Conversely, a new node can be added to
G’ to perform collusion between two sub-groups in a design.
We can calculate BC of a node as follows [18]:
BCi =
1
N(N − 1)
j=N∑
j=1
k=N∑
k=1,k 6=j
Ipj,k(ni) (3)
where the value of Ipj,k (ni) is ‘1’ if shortest path exists
between j and k and it passes through i.
Eigen Vector Centrality, EVC: computes the centrality of
a node by accounting centrality of nodes in its neighborhood.
Once we calculate the most influential nodes in G’ from C
and CC metrics, EVC can estimate the relative importance of
another node(s) in the periphery of the influential node. Similar
to BC, node(s) having highest EVC can work as payload, and
we can compute EVC by taking principle eigenvalue (λ) of the
adjacency matrix between HT triggering nodes and payload
node.
PageRank, PR: estimates the probability that a node can be
inserted in G’ based on the edge information of neighborhood
nodes. As the location of the future edge(s) is essential, and
attributes of nodes are entirely available in design [19], we
apply intimacy between neighbors to describe the likelihood
of edge.
k-Cores, kc: is a connected sub-graph of the network where
each node in the sub-graph has at least degree of k. Once we
compute C, CC, and BC, we can find the “degeneracy” of the
HT triggering cluster (highest value of k).
Density, D: denotes the connectivity information of a sub-
graph or graph. For strongly connected graph/sub-graph, D
is close to 1, and an attacker would avoid it as inserting
HT in this graph/sub-graph would influence more in changing
design parameters. If the information about the centrality and
its derivatives are not available, we can start with Kc=1 to get
the density of each sub-network(s) in the graph and rank them
from lower to higher. The cluster with the lowest rank can be
chosen to embed HT.
D. Motivational Example
We address the problem of HT localization using a bottom-
up technique, which is a fine-grained approach. We start with
removing the Primary Inputs (P.I.), and Primary Outputs (P.O.)
from DAG of design as inserting HT at the periphery of a
TABLE I: Impact of socio-network definitions on HT param-
eters analysis
Analysis Definitions Impact
Type Triggering Payload
Node-level
C 3 7
CC 3 7
BC 7 3
EVC 7 3
PR 7 3
Graph-level k-cores 3 3Density 3 3
RTL Design/
Synthesized Netlist
Graph Representation 
(Edge-labeled)
Node-level Analysis
(C,CC,BC,EVC, PR)
HT Vulnerability 
(Triggering and Payload)
Success Rate (%)
Fig. 1: Bottom-up analysis framework for HT vulnerability
analysis and localization
design can be easily detected. Then, we convert the node-
labeled DAG (G) into edge-labeled DAG (G’). We concentrate
on two crucial analysis (node- and graph-level). Node-level
analysis is mainly concerned with finding C, CC, BC, EVC,
and PR. It is more challenging to perform graph-level analysis
without any heuristics than node-level analysis. As there
could be multiple combinations of nodes in G’ depending on
various possibilities of node-level parameters and the impact of
considering the wrong candidate set for HT could be high, we
do pairwise comparison of C, CC, and BC of nodes before the
information can be passed down to calculating other properties
and confirming node status (Trigger or Payload).
With node level data, we can further verify two sub-graph
properties (Kc and D). In the top-down approach, we start with
the graph-based approach (coarse grain technique). Similar
to bottom-up, we only consider internal nodes and nets,
excluding primary input (P.I.) and primary output (P.O.). The
nodes are topologically sorted according to its degree, which
are further classified into clusters of a network according to kc.
We compute the density (D) of all clusters and rank them from
lowest to highest. Based on user preference, we can perform
further analysis of the nodes within the cluster ranked lowest.
Analytically, both approaches should locate the same rare nets
N1 N2
N8
N3 N6 N7
N9
N10 N12
N11 N13
N22 N23
1
1
1
1 1
1
2
2 2
3
33
4 4
(1,8,1) (3,8,1)
(8,11,2)
(3,9,1) (6,9,1)
(9,10,2) (2,10,1) (9,12,2) (7,12,1)
(10,11,3) (10,13,3) (12,13,3)
(11,22,4) (13,23,4)
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: (a) Node-labeled c17 circuit and (b) edge-labeled c17 circuit. Both diagrams are HT-free.
responsible for HT. In the rest of the paper, we implement the
bottom-up approach. A comprehensive framework for bottom-
up analysis is shown in Fig. 1. One can also adopt a top-down
approach; however, the success in HT detection would depend
on initial heuristics.
Consider a generic c17 circuit (node-labeled) from IS-
CAS85 benchmark and its corresponding edge-labeled circuit
in Fig. 2. The design has 5 P.I. and 2 P.O. in the node-labeled
graph and edge-labeled ones has 14 nodes which are edges
of node-labeled ones. Each edge in the node-labeled graph
is labeled incrementally. In the edge-labeled graph, the third
parameter associated with each node denotes the label of that
node. We remove nodes N1, N2, N3, N6, N7, N22, and N23
from further consideration.
TABLE II: Node attributes for possible HT localization
Node C CC BC EVC PR
(12,13) 0.2 0.2 0 0.98 0.24
(9,12) 0.2 0 0 1.96E-09 0.12
(8,11) 0 0 0 1.16E-019 0.12
(9,10) 0.4 0 0 -2.68E-10 0.12
(10,11) 0.2 0.2 0 -0.13 0.18
(10,13) 0.2 0.2 0 -0.13 0.18
In the rest of the section, we would refer to edge-labeled
graph representation for analysis. The attributes of the nodes
are shown in Table II. We can see the five nodes have a
centrality value of 0.2 or less, which is also calculated for
all nodes in closeness centrality. Then, we discard node (9,10)
from further consideration as it is reachable from the rest of the
nodes (C=0.4). As higher CC indicates maximum closeness,
we sort the CC column and find that the nodes (9,12) and
(8,11) both have minimum CC as well as moderate closeness
(C=0.2). However, for BC, we see the value of each node is
‘0’. This is because no shortest path exists between two nodes
that would cross any other node in the table. Hence, the nodes
(9,12) and (8,11) can act as HT triggering signals.
On the contrary, EVC and PR are closely related as both
can approximate the structure of incoming edge(s). The node
having the largest EVC and PR value should be chosen as
possible HT payload signal. Hence, the node (12,13) could be
used as a payload.
Based on the above relations between nodes, we can classify
the possible HT payload into two categories: (a) explicit
payload and (b) implicit payload. Explicit payload exhibits
a change in regular path delay, whereas implicit payload can
circumvent the path delay based fingerprint (i.e., no change
in path delay). The impact of both payload is shown in Fig.
3. The label (x/y) indicates the change in labeling where the
previous label was x, and the new label is y.
During explicit payload, we use existing nets (8,11) and
(9,12) to act as HT triggering signal (HTT), and the edge
between N12 and N13 is being modified to work as HT
payload (HTP) due to the inclusion of output of HTT. In
comparison to Fig. 2(a), the labeling of two edges (N12 →
N13 and N13 → N23) are modified, which denotes the delay
of critical path has been changed.
For implicit payload, we add an edge between nodes (N8
and N9), which would act as input to HTT with other input
being the edge between nodes (N9 and N12). However, we
have four choices to create additional nodes between (8,11)
and (9,12) who can act as HTT, as shown in Table III. Among
four possibilities, we choose node (8,9) as an additional HTT
signal. The output of HTT directly modifies the output of N13.
If N13 is being replaced with three input NAND, the output
will become ‘0’ when all inputs are HIGH (‘1’) i.e., which is
a rare condition (1 out of 8 combinations). Hence, the output
of HTT should be ‘1’ to change in the output of N13. Unlike
explicit payload, there is no additional gate to act as HTP,
and this also ensures the delay of paths towards P.O. is being
modified simultaneously.
E. Algorithm for combinational HT localization
We propose an algorithm as shown above to locate nodes
that can act as combinational HT. The design is considered to
N1 N2
N8
N3 N6 N7
N9
N10
N12
N11
N13
N22
N23
1
1
1
1 1
1
2
2 2
3
3
3
4
4/5
HTT
HTP
3
2
3/4
N1 N2
N8
N3 N6 N7
N9
N10 N12
N11 N13
N22 N23
1
1
1
1 1
1
2
2/3
2/3
3/43/4
4/5
2
HTT
43/4
4/5
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: Illustration of HT triggering and payload signals for (a) explicit payload and (b) implicit payload.
TABLE III: Characteristics of new node towards implicit HT
payload
Node Reasons for choice or not
(8,9) Impact both outputs’ paths without any delay difference
(8,12) Impact one output and present path anomaly
(11,12) Create a back-edge
(9,11) Reachable by visiting node N10
be represented as DAG and edge-labeled. We describe major
procedures in the algorithm as follows:
• Node extraction: For all nodes in the graph, we mark the
P.I., and P.O. and remove them from further considera-
tion.
• Triggering nodes location: For the rest of the nodes, we
calculate C, CC, and BC value. We sort the node in
ascending order based on the value of C. The node(s) in
the higher position(s) have larger C value and are marked
as influential node(s). Such nodes have a higher fanin and
fanout. Hence, adding a new node (edge) to these nodes
would have a significant impact on design parameters
which the attacker always wants to avoid. Therefore, we
remove the influential nodes. For the remaining nodes in
the list, we calculate an objective function (Fi). The nodes
showing the lowest F are given priority to be considered
as HT triggering signals.
• Payload node location: Once HT signals are known, we
sort the nodes (ascending order) according to BC value.
The node on the bottom of the sorted list is marked as
payload node. We choose this node as it should satisfy
the property: it would act as a bridge (hence reachable)
if there exist any shortest paths between HT triggering
nodes. Furthermore, the payload node should also exhibit
higher EVC and PR value. Higher EVC value confirms
that the node is closest to the most influential nodes in
the graph, which would manifest them HT triggering.
Similarly, depending on damping factor, PR establishes
that HTT signals would create new edge the node having
highest PR.
Fi = WC ∗ Ci
Cmax
+WCC ∗ CCi
CCmax
(4)
Algorithm 1 Sorted rare nets set for HT localization
Input: G’=Edge-labeled combinational design
Output: Nodes for HT localization
G”=Remove the nodes connecting primary inputs and
primary outputs
/* HT Triggering Nets */
for node in G” do
Calculate C,CC, and BC value
Remove the node(s) having highest C and CC value but
lowest BC value
for remaining node in G” do
Find importance of node by a objective function
end
Select top 3-4 nodes as possible HT triggering signals
end
/* HT payload */
for node in G” do
Calculate EVC and PR value
The node showing highest BC, EVC, and PR value is
possible HT payload signal
end
Return nodes with label (trigger or payload)
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We evaluate the socio-network analysis of HT localization
using NetworkX [20]. We tested the technique on combina-
tional HTs for ISCAS85 benchmark [21]. As mentioned in
TABLE IV: Performance of socio-network parameters in HT
detection
Design HT instances HTT HTP
TP FP FN TP FP FN
c2670 100 97% 1% 2% 100% 0% 0%
c3540 100 95% 3% 2% 99% 0% 1%
c5315 110 95% 1% 4% 98% 1% 1%
c6288 110 98% 2% 0% 97% 2% 1%
Average 96.25% 1.75% 2% 98.5% 0.75% 0.75%
Section III-C, each parameter influences the HT localization.
For each design (HT-free), we perform the same experiment
using different configuration parameters (e.g., change in damp-
ing value of PR) and we measure the success rate (%) for all
HT types under a particular design. For each trial, we use
all HT instances of design to calculate the success rate. We
use a total of ten snapshots of socio-network parameters. We
quantify the success in detection using three parameters:
• True Positive (TP): The technique correctly detects the
nets responsible for HTT and HTP.
• False Positive (FP): The technique detects the nets as
HTT and HTP incorrectly in HT infected design.
• False Negative (FN): The technique fails to detect nets
appearing as HTT and HTP.
We assume the HT triggering signals would contain at least
four nets whereas, for HT payload, it is only one signal. We did
not perform any additional experiment such as controllability
and/or observability, gate-level simulation to complement our
approach. We also did not set transition threshold to refer the
net as triggering. The HT infected designs do not contain any
implicit payload signal, and we always observe a change in
the path delay. Hence, we only presented the success rate for
explicit payload.
Table IV shows the success rate for four combinational
designs. On average, we can detect HTT for 96.25% time and
HTP for 98.5% time. Given that, there can be multiple HTP
signals, the FP and FN rate could be higher. For example,
in many HT instances of c6288, there is more than payload
signals. Similarly, around 10-15 instances create cycle when
combining nets to trigger HT. As our assumption is acyclic
graph representation to the algorithm, the method can not
detect this HTs. We did not experience any memory bottleneck
due to large size of the design. On average, 70% time is spent
to pre-characterize the nets, and the rest goes on checking HT
database.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We present a framework to detect diversity-agnostic HT
based on social network parameters. With only knowledge of
the design, a designer can find possible HT locations easily
without any expensive simulation or side-channel analysis.
We also present an algorithm to rank the parameters with
lower time complexity. We describe the feasibility of bottom-
up analysis approach. However, given enough run-time and
good heuristics, top-down analysis is also possible. Future
work includes the same parameters review for sequential HT
and at a higher abstraction level (e.g., algorithmic level).
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